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IN THE S,UPREME COURT
of the

STAllE OF UTAH
JOHN SHAW,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

Case No. 8991

FRANCES SHAW PILCHER and
WALTER F. PILCHER,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
The only question presented on appeal is the meaning of an "independent action'' within the purview of
Rule 60-B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are not in dispute. The action was not tried
upon its merits and no evidence was taken. Since the only
question involved is one of law re}ating to the procedural
propriety of the action commenced in the court below,
we will simply set forth a sufficient background of the
facts to frame the issue to be decided on appeal.
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Through a previous marriage, appellant John Shaw
and respondent Frances Shaw Pilcher had born to them
a daughter, Candace Lee Shiaw, now twelve years of age.
Upon their divorce, custody of the child was awarded
to Frances Shaw, who subsequently married respondent
Walter Pilcher. After the latter marriage, respondent
Walter Pilcher desired to adopt Candace Lee Shaw, and
appellant gave his consent to such adoption after having
been assured by respondents that they were financially
able and morally fit to provide a proper home for the
child, and that such adoption would be in the best interests
of the child. The adoption was granted on November 17,
1956 in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah (Decree).
On August 5, 1957 respondents plead guilty to the
crime of embezzlement in the United States District
Court for Utah and were sentenced to a prison term at
Terminal Isl,and Federal Penitentiary (Answer). On
February 29, 1958 respondents were released on probation and parol and returned to Salt Lake City (Answer).
Appellant discovered that respondents had plead guilty
to a series of embezzle1nents and that respondents had
probably been committing the eriine of embezzlement
from day to day over a protracted period of tin1e, including the time when the adoption proceedings were taking
place in 1956. AppeUant, concluding that the adoption
had been procured b)T fraudulent representations made
by respondents to the court, thereupon decided to attempt
to vacate the adoption and to secure to himself the
custody of Candace Lee Shaw so that he could insure to
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her proper care, comfort, instruction and security in his
home.
Accordingly, on March 31, 1958 appellant filed a Motion and Order which opened for inspection and copying
the 1adoption file of Candace Lee Shaw, Probate No.
39215. On April 21, 1958 appellant, using the same Probate ·Case Number, filed 'a Petition to vacate the adoption
and an Order requiring respondents to appear and show
cause why the adoption should not be vacated. The action
thus commenced was based upon two grounds ; namely
(1) the adoption was not procured by following the
proper statutory procedures and was therefore void, and
(2) the adoption was procured by fraud upon the court
and should therefore be vacated (Petition). The Petition
was accompanied by a Summons. A copy of the Summons, Petition, and Order to Show Cause were personally served upon respondents. Respondents engaged an
attorney to answer the Petition, and, consequently, the
Order to Show Cause was dismissed by appellant's
attorney so that the action could he prepared for trial
and determined upon its merits.
At the pre-trial conference, respondents filed an
Amended Answer alleging that the question of fraud
upon the court could only be tried by 1an independent
action since the •action pending had not been brought
within three months after the adoption had been granted.
The Amended Answer relied on Rule 60-B of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
In order to determine the meaning of Rule 60-B in
advance of a trial upon the merits, a special hearing was
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held to determine whether the action thus commenced by
' appelLant was proper for determining whether the adoption .had been obtained through fraud upon the court.
The lower court held that since more than three months
had elapsed between the adoption and the petition to vacate the adoption, the question of fraud upon the court
could only be tried by an independent action. The lower
court then concluded that Rule 60-B must be strictly construed, and that the action commenced by appellant was
not an independent action within the meaning of the Rule.
When appellant attempted to institute a new independent action it was discovered that respondents had
left U tab. and were residing in California. Since it was
thus impossible for appellant to obtain new service of
process over respondents, the present appeal was taken
challenging the lower court's construction of Rule 60-B.

ARGUMENT
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
ACTION COMMENCED BY APPELLANT WAS NOT AN
INDEPENDENT ACTION WITHIN THE MEANING OF
RULE 60-B OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

Rule 60-B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits the court, in certain situations, to relieve a party,
upon motion, from a final judgment, order, or proceeding. But Rule 60-B concludes:
"This rule does not limit the power of a court
to entertain an independent action to relieve a
party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to
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set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court~
The procedure for obtaining any relief from a
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action.''
If a motion under Rule 60-B asserts that a prior
judgment was void, then such mo.tion must be made within a "reason1able" time; whereas, if the motion asserts
that an adverse party committed fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct, then such motion must be made
within three months from entry of the judgment, order or
proceeding. Of course, these limitations do not prevent
an independent action from challenging a judgment on
the ground of fraud upon the court. The action commenced by appellant asserted (1) that the adoption was
void because the necessary statutory steps were not
followed, and (2) that the adoption should be vacated
since it was obtained by fraud upon the court. The first
issue was properly triable by motion since it merely
need be brought within a reasonable time, but the second
issue was properly triable by an independent action. The
question before this court on appeal is whether the action
commenced by appellant was proper for the purpose of
determining the question of fraud upon the court as well
as the question of failure to follow statutory steps.
It seems that the Utah Supreme Court has not yet
construed Rule 60-B for the purpose of distinguishing

between a motion ;and an independent action. The only
authority which has been found on the precise point under
discussion involves the construction of Rule 60-B of the
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. There are one or two
minor differences between the Federal Rule and the Utah
Rule, but, for purposes of the present analysis, the differences do not have any significance. Therefore, the construction applied to the Federal Rule is helpful in construing the corresponding Utah Rule.
Professor James W. Moore states that there are
no significant procedural differences between a motion
and an independent action under Rule 60-B. Professor
Moore explains that the independent action is expressly
excluded from the time limitations applying to several
of the motions under Rule 60-B because the rule did not
intend to limit or preclude a separate action for fraud
upon the court. Thus, stresses Professor Moore, if an
action is one properly triable by an independent action,
but is brought by motion, the motion should be considered as an independent action, and vi·ce versa. The
following quotations from Moore, Federal Practi'Ce, Vol.
7, are helpful :
At page 642:
"Where the adverse party is not prejudiced
an independent action for relief from a federal
judgment may be treated as a 60(b) motion; and,
conversely, a 60 (b) 1notion 1nay be treated as the
institution of an independent action."
At page 623:
"This independent ·action to enjoin or otherwise obtain relief from a federal judgment need
not be brought in the district court which rendered the judg1nent; but it n1ay be and, when it is,
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there is not much procedural difference between
it and a motion for relief under 60 (h) and hence,
disregarding nomenclature, the court, unless a
party would be adversely affected, may trea~ a
motion as the institution of an independent actwn
and an independent action as a motion for relief."
At page 502:
"And since nomenclature is unimportant a
proceeding for relief under 60 (h) may in an appropriate case be treated as an independent action; and simi}arly an independent action may he
treated as a proceeding under 60(b)."
This same conclusion is set forth in Barron and
Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, Rules Edition§ 1330, page 269.
The cases have also reached the siame conclusion as
that suggested by Professor Moore. Perhaps the leading
case on the very point at issue is Hadden v. Rumsey
Products, Inc., 196 F. 2d 92 (2nd Cir. 1952). In the
Hadden case the plaintiff reduced to judgment in the
United States District Court in Ohio certain cognovit
notes which had been executed by the defendant New
York debtors. Plaintiff then forwarded to the Clerk of
the United States District Court in New York a copy of
the Ohio judgment for registration. Upon learning of
such registration, the defendant New York judgment
debtors filed a petition for a show cause order in the
United States District Court in New York asserting that
they had valid defenses to the notes upon which the Ohio
judgment had been based. One of the questions on appeal
was whether the petition for a show cause order was an
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independent action within the meaning of Rule 60-B. In
concluding that the petition should be considered as an
independent action, the distinguished Second Circuit ably
stated the spirit and purpose of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure :
"Rule 60 (b) expressly provides that the rule
does not limit the power of a court to entertain an
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment. The appellees' several petitions to the
New York court may be treated as an independent
action to obtain equitable relief from the Ohio
judgment. Although Rule 3 states that an action
is commenced by filing a complaint it would be
quite out of harmony with the spirit of Rule 1
to hold the appellees bound by the labels placed
on the papers submitted to. the district court. Nor
is it necessary that a summons should have been
issued and served as contemplated by Rule 4, provided the appellant took action equivalent to
entering his general appearance."
A similar result was reached in Haggar Co. v. UniJted
States (U.S. Ct. Claims, 128 F. Supp. 404, February 8,
1955). In the Haggar case plaintiff brought an action
against the government in the Court of Claims arising
out of a contract whereby plaintiff had manufactured
for the government certain ite1ns of clothing. Plaintiff
sought to recover the contract price, but the governn1ent
defended on the ground tl1at plaintiff had defectively
manufactured the clothing and that it was "~orthless to
the government, and ,,·as ~wrapped. The Court of Claims
ruled against plaintiff. T"·o or three years later, plaintiff discovered that the government had used the clothing
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in question and that the prior judgment had been obtained by fraud upon the court in that the government
had submitted false affidavits. Accordingly, plaintiff
filed a new petition in the same case in the Court of
Claims alleging fraud upon the court in the prior judgment. One of the issues considered by the Court of
Claims was whether plaintiff's petition should be treated
·as an independent action within the meaning of Rule
60-B (Rule 54-B in the U.S. Court of Claims Rules). The
court concluded that it should be s'o considered, saying:

"If the plaintiff practices a fraud in the
prosecution of proof of his case in our court, he
forfeits his claim no matter how meritorious his
claim might otherwise have been, or how supererogatory may have been his attempted fraud. We
eannot .tolerate being misled into unjust judgments by answers to our calls which give us false
impressions as to material facts. We assume that
the writer of the communication in question had
no intention to mislead his associates, and we are
sure that his superiors, in responding to our eall,
had no intention to mislead the court. But, if the
plaintiff's present contentions are valid, the communication was, in its effect, a false representation to the plaintiff and to the court.
"We think that the most economical procedure, in the circumstances, is for us to treat the
plaintiff's present suit as an independent action
to be relieved of the former adverse judgment.
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
courts have been liberal in treating pleadings as
what they should have been, rather than what they
were called by the pleader."
It seems clear that there is even more justification
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for considering the ease at bar as an independent action.
The action was instituted by filing a petition and serving
respondents personally with the petition and summons.
'The name of the· case was different, although the same
case number as the adoption was used. Respondents engaged an attorney 'and were represented by counsel
throughout the entire proceeding, and respondents thus
filed an answer to appellant's petition and proceeded to
prepare the case for trial. Depositions were taken. A
Notice of Readiness for Trial was filed, and a pre-trial
conference was held. It was at the pre-trial conference
that respondents first urged any procedural defects in
the action commenced by appellant. Under such procedure, which was identical to an independent action in
every material respect, it is difficult to see how the lower
court could conclude that Under Rule 60-B the action
was nothing more than a motion. Such a holding is contrary to reason, and is in direct conflict with the unanimous declarations of the courts and treatise writers.
Furthermore, the decision of the lower court is directly contrary to the spirit and purpose of the rules of
civil procedure in that such decision would require two
separate trials for appellant to attempt to set aside the
adoption. This is so because appellant's contention that
the adoption was void because the necessary statutory
steps were not followed can only be tried by motion,
whereas appellant's contention that fraud was connnitted
upon the court ean only be tried by an independent action.
For the lo·wer court to conclude that the 1notion and independent action 1nust be strictly construed to be mu-
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tually exclusive under Rule 60-B is to complicate and
hamstring judicial procedure in Utah.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the
lower court was erroneous, and that the Order dismissing appellant's action should be reversed to allow a trial
upon the merits.

Respectfully submitted,

CLYDE & MECHAM
by RICHARD L. DEWSNUP
AttO'rneys for Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

